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STUDENTS AS TEACHERS, TEACHERS 
AS LEARNERS 
Derrick Bell* 
and Erin Edmonds** 
Knowledge emerges only through invention and re-invention, through 
the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry [men and women] 
pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other. 
. . . Education must begin with the solution of the teacher-student 
contradiction, by reconciling the poles of the contradiction so that both 
are simultaneously teachers and students. 
- Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed1 
FOREWORD 
Dear Harry: 
Your published critique of legal education, legal scholarship, and 
big law firm practice brought to mind our many discussions during 
your years on the Harvard Law School faculty, and particularly the 
many weekends my family spent at your summer home on Cape Cod. 
I recall those discussions generated far more heat than agreement. It 
was fun. In your strong attack on what you call "Law and" scholar-
ship, the Harry Edwards trademark, "strong views, vigorously ex-
pressed," is much in evidence. 
As you will see, I agree with some of your criticism of legal educa-
tion and legal scholarship. Much of what you condemn in large firm 
practice concurs with reports from hosts of former law students who, 
despite their high salaries, are unhappy with both what they are doing 
and how they are doing it. Even so, if we had talked prior to publish-
ing your piece, I would have vigorously challenged some of your 
assumptions. 
While it is true that critical race scholars and more than a few 
teachers in other "law and" fields depart from the traditional in legal 
writing and teaching, we do so precisely because we share your view 
that law students need a thorough grounding in the law - as it is. 
• Weld Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. B.A. 1952, Duquesne; 
L.L.B. 1957, Pittsburgh. - Ed. 
•• J.D. 1991, Harvard Law School. - Ed. 
1. PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 53 (Myra B. Ramos trans., Continuum 
Publishing Co. rev. ed. 1993) (1970). 
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Many of our students are committed to careers in public service or law 
reform. They must both learn contemporary doctrine and gain skill in 
using that knowledge to structure arguments and write briefs that ef-
fectively challenge the many injustices that now threaten our society in 
ways so dire, so dangerous, that few in policymaking positions are 
willing even to contemplate, much less attempt, much-needed reform. 
I know it was not your intention to undermine these commitments, 
but the fact is that, at many law schools, a strong and quite vocal 
majority of tenured law teachers are opposed to all writing that fails to 
adhere to traditional standards of scholarly writing. These protectors 
of scholarly orthodoxy are not able to define with any degree of speci-
ficity what they deem worthy.2 Perhaps for this reason, many law 
teachers - tenure safely earned years before - perform a strange 
obeisance to their scholarly ideals by writing little or nothing at all.3 
But it is not this unhappy truth that motivates this rebuttal. 
Rather, I want to diminish the effects of those traditional-minded 
faculty who are circulating your piece with great glee. They read it as 
both a condemnation of nontraditional scholarship and as the perfect 
weapon with which to oppose hiring or tenuring teachers attracted to 
any of the "law and" fields. Although you are far from the first person 
to criticize nontraditional writing, conservatives get special mileage 
when they are able to quote a black man whose views can be contorted 
into support for their opposition to nontraditional scholarship in gen-
eral and, in particular, any such writing by minority law teachers. 
You certainly did not intend your article to make life harder for 
the next generation of Harry Edwards and Derrick Bells. At no point 
do you raise issues of race or charges of discrimination. But this fact 
does not lessen the potential for serious harm your piece can and, I 
fear, will prove to be to the careers of many young law teachers who 
are meeting resistance and rejection as they attempt to address current 
legal issues with what you damn with faint praise as "law and" 
writing. 
2. Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 
CALIF. L. REv. 889 (1992), writes: 
As legal academics, we are constantly engaged in the process of evaluating legal scholar· 
ship, but we have no theory of evaluation. In fact, we rarely seem to perceive the need for 
such a theory. We conclude that a work of scholarship is good or bad, true or false, by 
intuition, trusting in some undefined quality of judgment. This leads to a wide range of 
conceptual and practical difficulties, difficulties that have festered to produce confusion and 
malaise throughout the field. 
Id. at 889. 
3. See, e.g., Michael I. Swygert & Nathaniel E. Gozansky, Senior Law Faculty Publication 
Study: Comparisons of Law School Productivity, 35 J. LEGAL Eouc. 373, 380-82 (1985) (con-
cluding that 44% of senior law faculty surveyed had no scholarly publications in the three-year 
period from 1980-1983). 
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I doubt that anything I can say in rebuttal can dissuade the status 
quo forces on law faculties from citing your article to justify their op-
position to anything nontraditional - regardless of quality and worth. 
I write because my commitment to critical race theory scholars re-
quires a response to your charges which, as applied to them, are inac-
curate and misdirected. 
In my response, I want to emulate your praiseworthy technique of 
drawing on the views and experiences of your former law clerks. After 
deciding to respond to your article, I recruited as coauthor, Erin Ed-
monds, a former student whose research efforts added greatly to my 
recent book, Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Ra-
cism. 4 After reading her draft, I decided that her views so well set out 
what I wanted to say that I found little either to add or to alter. Thus, 
while this response is coauthored, the Foreword is entirely mine, and 
the substance of the response is almost entirely Erin's. I retain the 
collective "we" in her work to reflect my agreement with her views. 
Erin and I write in the hope that some of those who now share 
your reservations about nontraditional legal scholarship will find rea-
son to reconsider. We write, as well, to provide a basis for defending 
nontraditional scholars and their work from those committed to op-
posing what they find unfamiliar and thus threatening. At the least, 
they may come to respect, as you and I do, the voices of our former 




In a recent article, Judge Harry Edwards writes about what he sees 
as a growing disjunction between legal education and the legal 
profession: 
[M]any law schools - especially the so-called "elite" ones - have aban-
doned their proper place, by emphasizing abstract theory at the expense 
of practical scholarship and pedagogy. Many law firms have also aban-
doned their place, by pursuing profit above all else. While the schools 
are moving toward pure theory, the firms are moving toward pure com-
merce, and the middle ground - ethical practice - has been deserted 
by both. This disjunction calls into question our status as an honorable 
profession. 5 
4. DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTIOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RA-
CISM (1992). 
5. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Pro-
fession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 34 (1992). 
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Judge Edwards divides his analysis of the cause of the crisis in 
ethical lawyering into an overview and three parts. The overview and 
first two parts deal mainly with the role of law schools and legal cur-
riculum in what he views as the deterioration of responsible, capable 
practitioners. This article takes issue with some of the assumptions, 
analyses, and conclusions those sections contain. The third part of 
Edwards' article analyzes the role of law firms in causing that same 
deterioration. This article agrees with and will elaborate upon that 
part of Edwards' treatment. 
Fundamentally, our position is that Edwards either overstates the 
case for the decline of doctrine in law schools - and hence mis-
analyzes the cause for the crisis in the legal world - or he conflates 
the (arguably) antidoctrinal tendencies of critical legal studies (CLS) 
with many other branches of modem jurisprudence, such as feminist 
jurisprudence, critical race theory, and gay and lesbian studies. This 
conflation, being overbroad, misleads the unfamiliar audience, and it 
reinforces the notion that nontraditional legal studies are little more 
than fluff. The conflation also reiterates, perhaps unintentionally, the 
master discourse's derisive tone towards all that is not the master dis-
course. We agree that there is a serious crisis of ethics in the world of 
the legal practitioner. We heartily agree that law firms' quest for prof-
its, and that quest's alarming demand for lawyers who are insensate to 
all but billable hours, contributes to the current crisis in ethical lawy-
ering. We disagree, however, that what is needed is more traditional-
ist doctrine from the law school. Nor do we agree that what is to be 
avoided is more interdisciplinary work. 
We approach Judge Edwards' article, we hope, with the respect 
due a thoughtful piece of work by an honored member of the profes-
sion. When our positions conflict with or criticize his, we intend that 
our message be not divisive, dismissive, or final, but rather that it be an 
indication of our desire to carry on constructive dialogue with those 
who, like Judge Edwards and ourselves, care deeply about the disposi-
tion of the legal world. 
I. JUDGE EDWARDS' POSITION ON LAW SCHOOLS AND 
LEGAL CURRICULUM 
The chain of logic in Edwards' argument, vastly simplified, goes 
something like this: 
• The profession needs ethical practitioners. 6 
6. Ethical practitioners are lawyers who occupy the middle ground between pure theory and 
pure commerce. Id. Ethical lawyers are professional; they "know why pro bono work is so 
August 1993] Students as Teachers 2029 
• The teaching of doctrine makes ethical lawyers. 7 
• "Practical" scholarship - which is prescriptive and doctrinal8 -
makes ethical lawyers. 
• What is not doctrinal is "impractical"; it is either not directly pre-
scriptive,9 or it is directly prescriptive but wholly theoretical. 10 
• "Impractical" scholarship is crowding out practical scholarship.11 
• The modern trend in leading law schools is away from doctrinal teach-
ing and toward impractical scholarship.12 
• The absence of doctrinal teaching and the rise of impractical scholar-
ship therefore cause or exacerbate the decline of ethical practitioners. 
Edwards employs the terms "practical," "doctrinal," and "ethical" 
subtly; summaries of Edwards' arguments about law schools, and 
therefore law schools' role in the decline of the profession, are admit-
tedly somewhat crude. For the purposes of this response, however, 
the summaries will have to do. 
Edwards says that "many law schools - especially the so-called 
'elite' ones - have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing ab-
stract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy."13 
Because practical scholarship is prescriptive and doctrinal, 14 and be-
cause it is set in opposition to "abstract theory," abstract theory is 
therefore not prescriptive, not doctrinal. The statement goes deeper in 
important," and they appropriately interpret cases and statutes as "normative texts •.. not mere 
missiles to be hurled at oppo[nents]." Id. at 38. 
7. Edwards states that a full and rich doctrinal education 
is a crucial part of the lawyer's technical development ..•. Any hack can misread cases, 
statutes, and other legal texts; it is much harder to read them well. Second, a doctrinal 
education is a crucial part of the lawyer's ethical development. The ethical lawyer should 
only advance reasonable interpretations of the authoritative texts - interpretations that are 
plausible from a public-regarding point of view. 
Id. at 59. 
8. Id. at 42-43. "Practical" legal scholarship, for Edwards, 
is prescriptive: it analyzes the law and the legal system with an aim to instruct attorneys in 
their consideration of legal problems; to guide judges and other decisionmakers in their 
resolution oflegal disputes; and to advise legislators and other policymakers on law reform. 
It is also doctrinal: it attends to the various sources of law (precedents, statutes, constitu-
tions) that constrain or otherwise guide the practitioner, decisionmaker, and policymaker. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
9. In other words, it does not address a problem that some practitioner or governmental 
decisionmaker must resolve. Id. at 46. Critical legal studies (CLS) exemplifies this type of "im-
practical" scholarship. Id. at 47. 
10. It prescribes a decision but ignores the applicable sources of law. Id. at 46. Law and 
economics exemplifies this type of "impractical" scholarship. Id. at 47. 
11. Id. at 50-51. 
12. "[S]chools are moving toward pure theory." Id. at 34. 
"The 'impractical' scholar . . . produces abstract scholarship that has little relevance to 
concrete issues, or addresses concrete issues in a wholly theoretical manner. As a conse-
quence, it is my impression that judges, administrators, legislators, and practitioners have 
little use for much of the scholarship that is now produced by members of the academy." 
Id. at 35. 
13. Id. at 34. 
14. Id. at 42-43. The paradigm, he says, of practical legal scholarship is the treatise. Id. 
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its meaning: abstract theory is impractical, spreading wildly, and 
therefore dangerous. Edwards focuses his discussion of dangerous or 
potentially dangerous modern trends on critical legal studies. In doing 
so, without explanation, he includes feminist jurisprudence, critical 
race theory, and other disciplines that he terms interdisciplines, some-
times referring to them as "law ands." The inference from this focus 
is that when Edwards is talking about the greedy nontraditional on-
slaught, he refers to critical legal studies, the "law and" movements 
(law and economics, law and literature), feminist jurisprudence, and 
critical race theory. Edwards credits what have been called nontradi-
tional methodologies with overrunning the traditional methodologies. 
Further, Edwards suggest that "abstract theory," (in contrast to 
"practical scholarship") is not useful, at least in his assessment of what 
is useful. Critical legal studies, which exemplifies impractical scholar-
ship, has "little direct utility for practitioners, judges, administrators, 
or legislators."15 
Edwards is also concerned that there are too many "law and" 
scholars.16 Doctrinal analysis, he says, citing Richard Posner, "is cur-
rently endangered at leading law schools."17 "Practical" scholars, he 
argues, face not only decreasing numbers, 18 but also "waning prestige 
within the academy."19 "Practical" scholars confront "aggressive in-
tolerance,"20 uncongeniality,21 and an "influx of 'impractical' 
scholars. "22 
According to Judge Edwards, this decline of practical scholarship 
and doctrinal education, combined with the law firms' abdication of 
their role in training lawyers, has somehow created a seriously endan-
gered species: the ethical practitioner. Judge Edwards does not use 
the term "ethical" in the same way one would use "principled" or 
"moral," although that is part of Edwards' claim. "Ethical" seems, 
rather, to mean "useful to judges, legislators, and administrators" as 
well as "aware of the lawyer's role as an officer of the court." Ed-
wards seems to suggest that impractical or interdisciplinary methods 
teach that practitioners are sellouts,23 although this claim is not sub-
15. Id. at 47. 
16. Id. at 50. 
17. Id. (quoting Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 
1113, 1113 (1981). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 36 (emphasis omitted). 
20. Id. at 37. 
21. Id. at 51, 62. 
22. Id. at 59. 
23. Id. at 38. 
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stantiated. Would-be lawyers24 in school therefore conclude that "law 
practice is necessarily grubby, materialistic, and self-interested."25 
Implicitly, those eager lawyers troop like lemmings over cliffs of repli-
cation, becoming themselves "grubby, materialistic, and self-inter-
ested." This is a crude summary of how and why law schools produce 
unethical lawyers. 
If law school fails in its task of producing ethical practitioners, 
what then does Judge Edwards think law school should do to meet its 
task? The answer is a bit circuitous. Law schools should fulfill their 
obligation to serve the system of justice by producing "practical" 
scholarship - scholarship "which addresses concrete problems."26 
Law schools should "train[ ] their students to practice law in a compe-
tent and ethical manner."27 While schools should not become antithe-
oretical,28 they should hire more "practical" scholars.29 Law schools 
should make themselves congenial places for concrete, "practical" 
analysis, and therefore for "practical" scholars. 30 Law schools should 
assign the "practical" scholars to teach the doctrinal curriculum31 
rather than, for example, assigning a Crit to teach a traditional or first-
year course like Contracts. Finally, law schools should attend more 
carefully to training graduates who can write in a cogent, organized, 
and instructive fashion. 32 
II. JUDGE EDWARDS' POSITION ON LAW SCHOOLS' 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE DECLINE OF ETHICAL PRACTITIONERS 
Judge Edwards obviously and understandably writes with the frus-
tration of one behind the bench who must view antagonism running 
rampant and probably a good deal of terrible writing as well. But es-
pecially in the portion of his analysis that attributes unethical lawyer-
ing in practice to the success of nontraditional disciplines in law 
school, Judge Edwards is out of touch with the disciplines he is assess-
ing - out of touch with their method, out of touch with their frequent 
ethic of progressivism and egalitarianism, and out of touch with their 
aspiration not to taunt the law but to transform it. On the other hand, 
24. Would-be lawyers seem to be quite a bit more suggestible in Judge Edwards' assessment 
than most law students with whom we have been in contact. 
25. Id. at 38. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 38-39. 
28. Id. at 39. 
29. Id. at 50. 
30. Id. at 51. 
31. Id. at 62. 
32. Id. at 63-65. 
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as will be developed in the second part of this essay, Judge Edwards 
seems very plugged into the pulse of the profit-driven engine of corpo-
rate law. That engine propels lawyers into workaholism and billable 
frenzies, to the exclusion of time or effort for public service, and very 
often to the exclusion of personal lives with partners, family, and 
friends. A secure, well-rounded lawyer worries not only whether she 
has done enough work, which is the hallmark of the obsession with 
hours, but whether she has done good enough work, whether that re-
quires producing an excellent draft or a commitment to work with 
those in need. 
A. Confusing by Conflation 
Judge Edwards confuses by conflation. Edwards uses the term 
"nontraditional" to embrace CLS, law and economics, law and litera-
ture, and "other interdisciplinary approaches, such as feminist legal 
studies, critical race studies, and moral theory."33 Although he credits 
all of these movements as having the "potential to serve important 
educational functions,"34 he also disparages them all, as a group. His 
is not mere generalization, nor even overbroad generalization; Ed-
wards, by lumping together anything that departs from what he con-
siders "practical" or "traditional," misrepresents the disciplines. He 
misrepresents their similarities (and common failings, in his estima-
tion). And he reproduces that strange state of affairs where one feels 
that the elephant, hyperbolically afraid of a mouse, describes the ro-
dent as something closer to a rhinoceros. To extend the pest meta-
phor: at the end of his article, Edwards notes with some relief that 
interdisciplinarian movements "have not yet overrun the law 
schools."35 In short, Edwards overcredits the strength of the non-
traditional movements even while he undercredits their validity. 
Here, Edwards badly misses the mark. The nontraditional is valid 
not because it complements the "real" bulk of legal scholarship. The 
nontraditional is valuable because it redefines what is "real" legal 
scholarship. Understandably, one who deals day in and day out with 
doctrine as it lags behind a revolution in thought may be unhappy 
33. Id. at 49-50. Edwards adds: 
[L]aw schools are moving toward pure theory .... 
Over the past two decades, law and economics, law and literature, law and sociology, 
and various other "law and" movements have come to the fore in legal education. We also 
have seen a growth in critical legal studies (CLS), critical race studies, and feminist legal 
studies movements. 
Id. at 34-35. 
34. Id. at 35. 
35. Id. at 77. 
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about that transformation. But to blame the arrival of fresh voices, 
often voices disempowered in the past, for the ethical failing of lawyers 
today is like blaming rock and roll for crack addiction. 
Edwards is careful to acknowledge that which he views as poten-
tially positive in these movements but consistently concludes that, 
while useful in a limited sense, interdisciplinarian scholarship ulti-
mately ranges from the irrelevant to the dangerously all consuming. 
For example, he notes various contributions each of the movements 
has made to the law school: CLS has provided a "critical, antiestab-
lishment view" largely absent in the past; law and economics has "im-
prove[ d] lawyers' understanding of efficiency"; law and literature has 
taught us to "read texts more closely and subtly"; feminist jurispru-
dence and critical race theory have inquired "usefully" about 
"whether the existing legal system is fundamentally unfair."36 Despite 
his attempts at balance, the conclusion that follows still hints at an 
onslaught of dangerous material: "However, I am concerned that 
there are too many 'law and' scholars."37 That conclusion comports 
with the tone that peppers his article's description of the nontradi-
tional in many places, a tone that reveals something between fear of 
and disdain for the nontraditional disciplines - again, grouped as 
"nontraditional" or "impractical" without meaningful distinction. 
Edwards speaks tellingly, for example, of these movements (femi-
nists, race crits, Crits, "law and" proponents) as "valuable addi-
tions."38 He calls interdisciplinarians "ivory tower dilettantes."39 He 
claims that the "impractical" scholars scorn doctrine,40 that they 
"scorn each other,"41 and that their "aggressive intolerance" creates 
an inhospitable atmosphere at law schools - inhospitable to those 
scholars who wish "to provide helpful guidance on pressing social 
problems, and not to fight ivory tower conflicts that are irrelevant to 
the outside world."42 Rejecting Professor George Priest's "graduate 
school" model oflegal education (which "all too many" law professors 
now favor), Edwards notes the "arrogant, antidoctrinal bias of in-
terdisciplinarians."43 While he says that law schools should have in-
terdisciplinarians, he warns in the same breath that law schools should 
36. Id. at 49-50. 
37. Id. at 50. 
38. Id. at 49 (emphasis added). 
39. Id. at 36. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 37. 
42. Id. at 37-38. 
43. Id. at 40. 
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not have scholars whose work "serves no social purpose at all."44 He 
decries that portion of interdisciplinary scholarship that he calls "in-
souciant pastiches," and, insisting that "no self-respecting academic 
journal would publish such scholarship," Edwards concludes that 
these so- called pastiches "have no place in the law reviews/'45 
Edwards highlights the student at Harvard Law School who "was 
fortunate to get mainly Traditionalists [his] IL year .... [Others] got 
stuck with Crits, and ended up at best wasting a year, and at worst 
becoming alienated from law school and the law."46 Critical legal 
studies, which Edwards categorizes as "impractical" because it is not 
directly prescriptive, at its best usefully challenges the justice system's 
political foundation, and at its worst is "hopelessly destructive because 
it aims to disrupt the accepted practice of judges, administrators and 
legislators with no prescriptions for reform."47 
Proponents of CLS have certainly faced previously the charge of 
nihilism, that is, that their method seeks to annihilate the stability and 
self-assurance of long-held canons of law without offering any particu-
lar replacement. In jargon, Crits are accused of "trashing" main-
stream legal academia without offering any alternative.48 In reality, 
although this is not the place to develop a full argument about the 
method and mission of CLS, CLS scholars have offered plenty of con-
structive, concrete alternatives; some of those constructive and con-
crete alternatives, through years of hard work and pressure, have even 
been enacted. These alternatives are just not the alternatives that sit 
well with the politics of the mainstream. But "undesirable in the eyes 
of the mainstream" does not equal what Edwards calls "hopelessly 
destructive. "49 
More important than the debate about the constructiveness or con-
creteness of CLS is the tacit inclusion of other disciplines that are 
somewhat related to CLS and probably sympathetic to much of CLS's 
ideology - with the exception of the conservative law-and-economics 
movement - but are astonishingly different disciplines. Feminist ju-
risprudence, for example, shares with CLS - and every other method 
that questions the status quo, including liberalism - a critical ap-
proach. Feminist jurisprudence also rejects the notion that current hi-
44. Id. at 36. 
45. Id. at 56. 
46. Id. at 39 (quoting Practitioner #1, at 1). 
47. Id. at 47. 
48. See, e.g., Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984). 
49. See id. at 297-304 (discussing a range of concrete CLS contributions, from proposals to 
expand the rights of workers to strike over midterm grievances, to reformulating our ideas about 
the meaning of informed consent in the medical area). 
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erarchies (in this case, male supremacy) are natural, immutable, and 
acceptable. But where CLS critiques many power relations, including 
that of men over women, feminist jurisprudence focuses, albeit not ex-
clusively, on the disparity of power between men and women. so 
Feminist jurisprudence has forced or seeks to force change in 
plenty of "concrete" areas; "concrete" at least, from the point of view 
of a woman. There are many examples: Elizabeth Schneider, along 
with other feminist lawyers, has created and is refining constantly 
what has come to be known as the "battered woman's defense."5 I 
Catharine MacK.innon and Andrea Dworkin have pioneered not only 
new perspectives on the violence towards women in pornography, but 
they have also drafted legislation to prevent pornographic exploita-
tion. 52 Feminist efforts have finally brought the frequency and ugli-
ness of sexual harassment to the forefront of the legal consciousness; 
today, because of these concrete and constructive efforts, most if not 
all businesses have policies against sexual harassment. Laws against 
sexual harassment in the workplace are enforced more frequently. 
Feminist efforts have also brought about concrete laws in the rape con-
text: no longer, in most states, is a victim's past sexual history admis-
sible. Rape shield laws protect rather than blame the potential victim. 
The concrete, practical list goes on. 
Feminist jurisprudence, therefore, is impractical only if one be-
lieves that the needs and claims of real women have no merit in the 
50. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimina-
tion, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32 (1987). MacKinnon states: 
To summarize the argument: seeing sex equality questions as matters of reasonable or 
unreasonable classification is part of the way male dominance is expressed in law. If you 
follow my shift in perspective from gender as [mere] difference to gender as [male] domi-
nance, gender changes from a distinction that is presumptively valid to a detriment that is 
presumptively suspect. 
Id. at 44. 
Feminism has been charged with being too tied to the idea of "gender" - not because the 
subordination of women has ended, but rather because white feminists may practice "gender 
essentialism" to the exclusion of race and class factors, which results in the silencing of women of 
color. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentla/ism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 581 (1990). 
51. See Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in 
Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 121 (1985); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial 
for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623 (1980); Anita 
L. Grant, Note, The Battered Woman: When a Woman's "Place" Is in the Courts, 10 CRIM. 
JUST. J. 273 (1988). Challenging the male-normed assumption that self-defense requires "immi-
nent" harm (like a gun to the head), feminist lawyers have successfully demonstrated that a 
sensible woman who has been beaten bloody time and again, knowing her physical limitations in 
relation to a man's, would not wait for the moment her abuser raised his hand to strike with 
deadly force. She would have no chance. A battered woman's conception of self-defense, espe-
cially in the frequent cases where the man threatens that next time he will kill her, is to stop his 
abuse where the law does not. 
52. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Linda's Life and Andrea's Work, in FEMINISM UN-
MODIFIED, supra note 50, at 127. 
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traditional canon - because feminist legal studies certainly attends to 
the doctrinal analysis that Edwards defines as a hallmark of "practi-
cal" scholarship. How can one seek to change doctrine that one does 
not know about or thoroughly understand? To be sure, feminist legal 
studies is often explicitly prescriptive, another of Edwards' character-
istics for practical or useful scholarship: adherents draft concrete 
model laws that prescribe that men may not abuse women with impu-
nity, may not exploit women with impunity, and may not dismiss cen-
turies of "tradition" with the caveat that "boys will be boys." 
Feminist legal scholars and activists also concretely lobby politicians 
to buttress, through new legislation, right-to-choice law that is increas-
ingly under attack in the Supreme Court. Through scholarship and 
coalition, feminist legal adherents concretely encourage women to 
bring hitherto buried charges of sexual harassment against Supreme 
Court nominees and congressmen. When the work of feminist legal 
scholars is not explicitly prescriptive, it is often implicitly so; in their 
writing, their conferences, and their classrooms they explore how best 
to ensure that women shed their second-class cloak in both the letter 
and spirit of the law. 
To call this type of work "impractical" by lumping it with law and 
economics, for example, is at best misguided. The "impractical" label, 
or the insinuation that feminist legal work is marginal to "real" legal 
scholarship, misapprehends feminist legal studies. It misapprehends 
the very real extent to which women insist on being included in the 
master discourse of law - not as afterthoughts or side commentators, 
but as full and equal participants. The work of feminist legal studies 
seeks to understand and make law more responsive to 51 percent of 
the population. The history of law has been a history of male (white) 
supremacy; to interpret doctrine in a positivistic fashion - that is, in 
the way it has always been done - does more than merely condone 
male supremacy. It fortifies it. · 
Critical race theory, also included by Edwards in the impractical, 
interdisciplinary, somewhat-useful-but-ultimately marginal category, 
deserves more accurate analysis than that. Examples of "doctrinal" 
and "practical" critical race scholars abound: 
• Chuck Lawrence's analysis of and recommendations for reinterpreting 
First Amendment law;53 
• Mari Matsuda's analysis of and recommendations for interpretation of 
equal protection laws, in the context of her discussion of reparations 
to African Americans, Asian Americans, and Native Americans, all of 
53. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on 
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431. 
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whom were or are legally mistreated on the basis of race;54 
• Patricia Williams' incisive analysis of doctrinal contract and constitu-
tional law in her breathtaking book, The Alchemy of Race and 
Rights,· 55 
• Kim Crensbaw's demonstration that Title VIl's employment discrimi-
nation prohibition in particular, and the law in general, treats women 
of color as if they were invisible;56 
• Richard Delgado's ground-breaking treatment of civil rights 
literature;57 
• Robert Williams' historiographical analysis of the Western legal ca-
non's treatment of indigenous peoples;58 
• Derrick Bell's constitutional law classes are almost entirely doctrinal, 
and very practitioner-oriented; students form teams of advocates, take 
opposite sides on a pressing and concrete constitutional issue - for 
example, poor women's lack of access to the "right" to an abortion -
and must brief and argue their case before a panel of student "judges." 
His scholarship, too, uses doctrine as a departure point for bis now-
famous storytelling method, a method whose usefulness may not be 
immediately apparent to someone who reads briefs all day long. 
Perhaps someday, however, the experientially based viewpoint will re-
place the contemporary and positivistic obsession with the "rules of 
law and the law of rules." The positivist bases validity on that which 
is in place simply because it has endured for a long time, thus ignoring 
the fact that Black women and men, Asian women and men, and 
white women could not vote or hold office when many of these rules 
had their genesis. 
Critical race theory, in other words, both "trashes" and seeks to 
transform current doctrinal law - both statutes and their interpreta-
tions. When at all possible, adherents of critical race theory generally 
try to work with the doctrine that is in place. But when the doctrine is 
completely inhospitable to reform, should critical race scholars be 
called "impractical" or their work "a valuable addition" simply be-
cause they propose entirely new doctrine, doctrine that is substantively 
as well as facially loyal to the proposition that the law has no business 
S4. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987). 
SS. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991). 
S6. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. 
Cm. LEGAL F. 139, reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY S7 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rose-
anne Kennedy eds., 1991). 
S7. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights 
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. S61 (1984). 
S8. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial Dis-
crimination Against Indigenous Peoples' Rights of Self-Determination, ARIZ. J. INTL. & COMP. 
L., Fall 1991, at Sl. 
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in subordinating, or assisting in the subordination of, people who are 
not white? 
We have argued that Edwards' treatment of what he calls "imprac-
tical" scholarship mischaracterizes many of the disciplines he targets 
as members of that group. Further, simply because he groups all non-
traditional work together, he sweepingly delegitimizes work whose le-
gitimacy is almost always in question anyway, given the intransigence 
of traditional approaches to law. We have noted that his decrying of 
the decline of "traditional, practical, useful, doctrinal" scholarship 
and training seems both inaccurate (in terms of the "decline") and a 
bit nostalgic (perhaps it is time to change?). We have pointed to places 
where, despite good efforts to be fair to the contributions of nontradi-
tional approaches, he retreats to a somewhat defensive, and somewhat 
derisive, treatment of those methods. In addition to our concern that 
Edwards unfairly conflated feminist jurisprudence and critical race 
theory with what he deems impractical, we doubt some of the assump-
tions on which his analysis rests. 
B. Hidden or Questionable Assumptions in Edwards' Article 
There are more subtle problems with Edwards' analysis of legal 
scholarship and training, including quite a few hidden and questiona-
ble assumptions. Perhaps the most general and most frustrating is his 
tacit advocacy of legal positivism. That is, Edwards wants to focus on 
the rules of law and the law of rules; he wants to predicate ethical 
lawyering on the capacity to summarize, interpret, and communicate 
what is contained in current legal texts. Implicitly, Edwards exalts the 
evolution of doctrine. But perhaps the current set of rules is, on any 
moral analysis, unethical. Suppose those who drafted the rules did so 
with insidious intent, or in a context in which they ignored entire 
populations of people. Perhaps the evolution of these rules occurred 
in a white male heterosexist Christian supremacy. Is the evolution 
therefore still valid? Is it therefore ethical to adhere to one's interpre-
tation simply because the law has developed in the way that it has? In 
short, Edwards adheres to a gradualist, positivist ideology, and he uses 
that ideology as his normative yardstick, without ever explaining why 
the laws of old are necessarily the laws of good. 
There are specific examples of hidden assumptions as well. First, 
and not in any order of importance, Edwards agrees with Judge Stan-
ley Fuld's position on what a law review article should accomplish. 
Edwards writes, "[t]he article writer should serve as a 'judge of 
judges,' or of other governmental decisionmakers; he or she should 
assume the same attitude toward authoritative texts that the deci-
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sionmaker rightly would. Only if the writer does so will the article 
have practical import."59 In making this statement, Edwards assumes 
1) articles should only be written for those who interpret or create 
legal texts; 2) judges and governmental decisionmakers fairly represent 
the community which the law is supposed to serve; 3) there is a 
"right" attitude toward authoritative texts; 4) authoritative texts 
ought to be interpreted within their bounds, not questioned outright; 
and 5) the "authoritative" in "authoritative texts" is acceptable. 
Second, Judge Edwards questionably describes the clerks whom he 
polled for supporting material as "among the most talented and suc-
cessful people in the legal profession. 60 Are these people "among the 
most talented and successful" because their work has not been 
marginalized by generally hostile social forces and particularly hostile 
legal ones? Are they successful because they excel at the status quo 
game? Is that the only definition of "successful" that members of our 
profession want to advance? 
Third, Judge Edwards defines the paradigm of "practical" legal 
scholarship to be the treatise. 61 There are other possibilities. The im-
portant political and educational efforts - as well as the amici curiae 
filed in Roe v. Wade 62 - to make abortion legal in this country cer-
tainly seem paradigmatically "practical" in hindsight. Academic legal 
work that gives the otherwise voiceless a voice - stories, for example, 
told from the point of view of the oppressed - when there is simply 
no existing legal framework within which to discuss the oppressiveness 
of (white, male, straight, Christian) "objectivity" - may be able to 
affect pragmatically those in power in a way that treatises on existing 
law cannot. Human beings are enormously creative, and we often un-
derstand and learn by metaphor. Why should that type of learning 
not be "practical"? If it opens the eyes of the collectively empowered; 
if, for example, it leads one and then another judge to reconsider the 
way she looks at homosexual custodianship of children; if it unearths 
the hidden issues of a popular - and powerful - culture so that real 
dialogue may begin, how is that not "practical"? 
Fourth, Edwards subtly assumes that "plain language"63 is exis-
tent, verifiable, anct valid. Speaking of the "practical" scholar who 
should use "theory" only on "hard" or "very hard" issues (but not for 
59. Edwards, supra note 5, at 45 (citing Stanley A. Fuld, A Judge Looks at the Law Review, 
28 N.Y.U. L. REv. 915, 917-18 (1953)). 
60. Id. at 42. 
61. Id. at 43. 
62. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
63. Edwards, supra note 5, at 44. 
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"easy" ones), Edwards writes, "the 'practical' scholar who is address-
ing a judge does not advance theoretical reasons for some outcome 
that the plain language of a relevant statute prohibits."64 Aside from 
any CLS critique that there is no such thing as "plain language" ab-
sent the ideological context in which it is written, read, interpreted, 
and applied, Edwards does not even seem to flinch at his rather abso-
lutist and bright-line designation of "plain language." Isn't that what 
a lot of the arguing in the law is about, just exactly what is the "plain 
language" interpretation of a particular rule? 
Fifth, Edwards dubiously intimates that the law should be or re-
main isolationist. He warns that "[t]oo many law professors are ivory 
tower dilettantes,"65 and he speaks of nontraditional methods as "aca-
demic" and "completely imitat[ing] the professors of arts and sci-
ences."66 The assumptions here are that law professors should not, as 
a rule, dabble or be involved in other disciplines, and that if they are, 
they are not scholars in a legal sense and are mere imitations of a form 
not suited to them. But why should the law be autonomous, a sphere 
of human life unto itself? In fact, can the law even pronounce itself 
isolationist?67 The insinuation that the law is a self-evident and natu-
rally evolving system of rules and logic that should remain apart from 
"academic disciplines" in its "practical" moments is simply formalism 
with a modern face. 
Finally, and perhaps most disconcerting, Edwards assumes that 
"traditional" legal study appropriately does not include disciplines like 
critical race theory and feminist legal studies. When assessing with 
approval that many law school courses still bear "traditional" labels, 
in the next breath Edwards warns of "the influx of 'impractical' schol-
ars," thereby relegating all that he has designated as "impractical" -
CLS, "law ands," critical race theory, feminist legal studies - as a 
threat to, and not part of, what should be considered as appropriate 
traditional training. Why shouldn't law schools require every poten-
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 36. 
66. Id. at 48. 
67. The idea that the law is not isolationist, even if it advertises itself as such, is quite old. At 
the beginning of the twentieth century, realists began their critique of formalism by pointing out 
that legal rules have context and history, and that the interpretation of those rules does not occur 
in a vacuum. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 
(1989). Grey states: 
Not only Holmes, but Gray, Nicholas St. John Green, Thayer, and Wigmore, and in the 
next generation Arthur Corbin - conceptualists all in their legal scholarship - were critics 
of (or at least deviants from) Langdellianism. They did not accept Langdell's insistence that 
legal thought could and should be autonomous and universally formal as well as concep· 
tually ordered. 
Id. at 825. 
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tial lawyer to learn about the history, legal and otherwise, of race rela-
tions, as well as where the doctrine stands today? Why, given the 
incarceration, unemployment, poverty, and underemployment rates of 
African, Native, and Latino Americans, should any law student not be 
required to learn about how racially subordinated status was encoded 
very early in legal documents like the Constitution? Why, given that 
the overwhelming majority of those who rape and murder women are 
their male partners or acquaintances, should gender discrimination 
not be a required part of the traditional curriculum? The crimes 
against people of color and against women are part of a long and ugly 
tradition, from which the law, in letter and spirit and effect, cannot 
divorce itself. 
C. Inaccurate Equivalents 
Judge Edwards, probably unintentionally, also creates subtle but 
insidious equivalents in his analysis of how law schools create unethi-
cal lawyers. Most perplexing is the article's general suggestion that 
nontraditional disciplines, which allegedly disdain doctrine and practi-
tioners, are responsible in farge part for the increase in unethical law-
yers. 68 More specifically, for example, Edwards' analysis implies that 
nontraditional disciplines do not teach people to use legal texts, to in-
terpret texts skillfully, and to communicate both orally and in writing. 
The logic goes something like this: critical race theory, critical legal 
studies, and feminist jurisprudence, for example, are "interdiscipli-
nary" and "impractical" and are therefore, according to Edwards' ear-
lier description, nondoctrinal. In contrast, doctrinal education means 
that: 
the law student should acquire a capacity to use cases, statutes, and 
other legal texts. . . . This person is also skilled at interpretation: the 
reading of a case or statute, or a mass of case law, or a complex regula-
tory scheme. Finally, this person can communicate the interpretive un-
68. Judge Edwards states: . 
[E]thics can and should be taught pervasively, in almost every law school course. As one 
former law clerk notes: "[T]here is very little emphasis on the role of the attorney in society, 
the boundaries of good advocacy, or the responsibility of the attorney to other parties and 
courts in law school." The "role of the attorney" can be addressed whenever law teachers 
discuss practical legal problems - be they problems of contracts law, or antitrust law, or 
labor law. Here, again, is the link between scholarship and pedagogy: "practical" scholars, 
who attend concrete legal problems in their scholarship, and ideally have practiced law 
themselves, are much better suited to teach law studen~ what ethical practice means. 
Edwards, supra note 5, at 74 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Practitioner # 10, at 5). The inference 
here is that those whom he calls "impractical" scholars - again, critical legal scholars, critical 
race scholars, feminist legal scholars, "law and" scholars - do not address "concrete legal 
problems" in their scholarship and are not well suited to teach students what ethical practice 
means. 
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derstanding, both orally and in writing. 69 
By positing a doctrinal education as text oriented, interpretive, and 
communicative, and by juxtaposing doctrinal ("practical") against 
nontraditional ("impractical") disciplines, Edwards communicates 
that nontraditional disciplines do not teach textual use, interpretation, 
or communication. 
We believe he is either mistaken or unfamiliar with the essence of 
many of the ·movements he designates as "nontraditional." Indeed, 
the essence of critical race theory, for example, revolves around criti-
quing modem cases, statutes, interpretations, and other legal texts. It 
is impossible to launch a sophisticated critique of a discipline one does 
not understand. Perhaps Edwards is therefore saying that critical-
race-theory critiques are not sophisticated. In addition, critical race 
theory is almost exclusively about interpretation, especially of funda-
mental fairness in the law - it simply seeks to teach people how to 
interpret doctrine and texts and precedent in ways other than the 
traditional white male perspective. Finally, critical race theory, often 
communicated in uncommon ways (like Bell's stories, Williams' vi-
gnettes, and Matsuda's metaphors and allusions to popular culture), 
may be better at communicating and teaching people to communicate 
than what has been, up to now, a very strict and structured formula 
for communicating legal interpretations. 
Feminist theory, too, albeit "nontraditional," has everything to do 
with interpreting text and communicating that interpretation. In fact, 
much of feminist legal work tries to tease out the voice of women, or 
the absence thereof, in "authoritative" legal texts - certainly a con-
troversial subject, but no less "doctrinal" or "interpretive" for being 
so. If feminist lawyers are not always able to communicate their inter-
pretations via treatise or brief and must therefore do so in law review 
articles and conferences, it is probably because they lack the access to 
the courts and legislatures, not the talent to communicate their 
interpretations. 
D. Unsupported Assertions 
Finally, there are crucial and controversial claims in his article 
that Edwards simply asserts without explanation. For example, Ed-
wards states that "[t]here is good reason to doubt ... whether there is 
any coherent design or consistency in legal education any longer. "70 
69. Id. at 57. 
70. Id. at 58-59. 
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What reason grounds his doubting? Was there ever coherence or con-
sistency in legal education? Is the law itself coherent and consistent? 
In another place, he "insist[s] merely that doctrine should be 
taught well, where it is taught."71 This "mere" insistence seems to fly 
in the face of a rather long article that makes much more than just this 
point; the statement, and the rest of the article, does not acknowledge 
even the possibility that the "traditionalists" have failed their task. 
Judge Edwards describes, without explanation, the "waning pres-
tige" of" 'practical' scholars" within the academy.72 What evidence 
supports his statement about "waning prestige"? Our experience is 
quite the contrary; nontraditionalists often have a very hard time be-
ing taken seriously and being offered tenure. 73 
Judge Edwards also accuses interdisciplinarians of "us[ing] the law 
school as a bully pulpit from which to pour scorn upon the legal pro-
fession. "74 Again, the statement is unsubstantiated and differs from 
our experience. I recently confronted bully pulpits in my and my 
peers' "traditional" or "doctrinal" contracts, torts, property, constitu-
tional law, and race-racism classes. On the pulpit stood the professor, 
whom Edwards would probably describe as a "practical" scholar, bul-
lying not the profession of law, but rather the student wanting to enter 
it. Is that better than bullying the profession? Despite a wide variety 
of "interdisciplinary" or "impractical" classes, this graduate of 
Harvard Law School never heard a so-called "impractical" scholar de-
ride the practice of law at all, much iess in bullying fashion. 
Citing Harvard as an example, Judge Edwards announces that the 
"legal academy sometimes has become uncongenial to thoughtful, dia-
logic, unbiased scholarship. "75 Is there such a thing as "unbiased" 
scholarship? How would Edwards reply to Duncan Kennedy's inti-
mation that "there is no intellectual space outside of ideology"?76 
Could he reply to it? 
To his credit, Judge Edwards uses strong terms. To his detriment, 
the terms are not self-evident. "The ethical lawyer," he writes, 
"should only advance reasonable interpretations of the authoritative 
71. Id. at 62. 
72. Id. at 36. 
73. See Derrick Bell, The Final Report: Harvard's Affirmative Action Allegory. 87 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 2382 (1989); Richard Delgado & Derrick Bell, Minority Law Professors' Lives: The Bel/-
Delgado Survey, 24 HARV. C.L.-C.R. L. REV. 349 (1989). 
74. Edwards, supra note 5, at 37. 
75. Id. 
76. Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 705, 727 (1990). 
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texts."77 Goodness. What is "reasonable"? The NAACP lawyers' 
legal arguments in Brown v. Board of Education18 probably were not 
"reasonable interpretations of authoritative texts." The "authoritative 
texts" of that time accepted without question a Fourteenth Amend-
ment whose drafters had not anticipated school desegregation and a 
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson 19 that separate could be equal. 80 Is 
Judge Edwards willing to argue that what is not perceived by the 
mainstream as a "reasonable" interpretation is therefore an unethical 
interpretation? Is he willing to argue that rejecting the authoritative 
texts out of hand is unethical? 
Finally, Judge Edwards cites a law clerk describing another stu-
dent's experience in an "impractical" scholar's first-year civil proce-
dure class. "I can't imagine," the clerk writes, "a more damaging 
experience for law students than to be stuck in [that professor's] 
class."81 It is difficult to take this claim seriously if the most damaging 
experience this student can think of consists in attending a nontradi-
tional presentation of civil procedure. Since anecdotal evidence is the 
support for much of Edwards' article, let us offer an anecdote about 
damaging pedagogy. 
Day after day in my first-year contracts class at Harvard, we 
plowed through cases, statutes, and the Uniform Commercial Code 
with great thoroughness and care. The professor, a white man, reiter-
ated his commitment to doctrine, and we found ourselves imperiled 
daily as he scanned his seating chart for victims. He usually ended up 
impaling the student during a procession of complicated questions, 
and he seemed particularly disdainful when women would get quiet in 
the face of his humiliation. He made a few students cry and a few 
leave the class permanently. He was, ironically, very interested in the 
concept of the "ethical" lawyer. Time and again he would exhort us 
to "read intelligently," to "speak coherently," and to "be prepared." 
He told war stories about his tenure in private practice. Into his con-
cept of "ethical" there never strayed one iota of compassion, listening, 
empathy, a willingness to compromise, or setting aside one's ego. We 
77. Edwards, supra note 5, at 59. 
78. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
79. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
80. One also thinks of NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964), and Gomil· 
lion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, the Court read 
First Amendment protection into settled law that corporations were entities of the state and 
subject to all reasonable state rules. Southern states had been suppressing groups like the 
NAACP through the state's authority to regulate corporations. In Gomillion, attorneys for 
plaintiff convinced the Court to set aside its long-standing refusal to adjudicate conflicts over 
legislative boundary drafting (that is, political gerrymandering). 
81. Edwards, supra note 5, at 60 (quoting Practitioner #1, at 3). 
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were to win, and to win thoroughly. And doctrinally. At the final 
exam, I could not believe my eyes when I read the question that asked 
whether under contract law a white aunt had the right to disinherit a 
grand-nephew who was Black, because he was Black. I looked up, and 
I was one of the few white faces to do so. What I saw was awful: in 
the eyes of many of the African-American women swelled huge tears; 
great frustration raged. in the eyes of the African-American men. 
Then we all had to write the final exam. Or fail. In that same doc-
trinalist's casebook (from which he taught), he began a chapter on 
offer and acceptance in contract law with an epigraph containing dia-
logue between a man and a woman: the woman, upon being proposi-
tioned, said "no." And the question was: Ah, yes, but did she really· 
mean it? 
In another doctrinalist's class, we spent one day - one day -
discussing rape law. The doctrinal development of Miranda, which I 
have never had occasion to use, took two weeks. In yet another tradi-
tionalist's class, we spent one day - one day - discussing the enslave-
ment of Black human beings as property. The law of perpetuities, 
which I have never seen since, took three weeks. 
In sum, Edwards notes that our "status as an honorable profes-
sion" is being called into question. Whether we were ever so honora-
ble is another article entirely. But to attribute the decline of our 
honorability to a (factually questionable) coup d'etat by nontradi-
tional-nondoctrinal-"impractical" legal studies seems tenuous at best, 
unfair and distorted at worst. While Judge Edwards says he rejects 
Langdellian formalism and does not believe the case method is an ef-
fective method of teaching, in the end his prescription for what law 
schools absolutely cannot do without, and allegedly are losing rapidly, 
sounds very much like nineteenth-century formalism. 
On the other hand, Edwards' analysis of how law firms have con-
tributed to the self-absorption of legal practitioners is very contempo-
rary. It seems strange that, in the first part of his article, he essentially 
concludes that the law should be isolationist, that nonlegal scholars do 
interdisciplinary work better than legal scholars, and that the "practi-
cal" scholar has no business doing anything except writing treatiselike 
articles that tell judges how to decide hard or very hard cases. What is 
strange is that, in the second part of his article, he admonishes current 
practitioners to uphold the legal ethic of public service, which is not so 
different than what many, if not most, of the interdisciplinary move-
ments advocate. 82 The involved lawyer cannot also be an isolationist 
82. Save law and economics, and law and literature, perhaps. 
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lawyer. Edwards seems acutely aware that law firms, driven today as 
never before by profit and billable hours, have created lawyers who 
have no time and no energy for public service, lawyers who can barely 
take care of themselves, much less the problems of other people. 
JI. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF EDWARDS' CLAIM THAT LAW 
FIRMS HAVE ABDICATED THEIR ROLE IN SHAPING 
ETHICAL PRACTITIONERS 
Judge Edwards writes: 
Few of my former law clerks are sanguine that practicing lawyers 
have reached the right balance [between their duties as "advocates" and 
"officer[s] of the court," between pro bono representation and profit 
seeking]. Almost every respondent to my survey deplored the ethical 
failings of the practicing bar. There was a general consensus that prac-
ticing lawyers are overly concerned with profit: "they care about money, 
money, money." One clerk suggested that private firm lawyers must 
"Bill or Be Banished. ,,53 
Law firms have become maniacal in their quest to squeeze every 
drop, no matter the human cost, from their associates. This quest for 
profits, with its outrageous pressure to bill high hours and work longer 
hours Qeaving at 7 p.m. after a ten-hour day is considered "leaving 
early") is destroying the spirit of many young lawyers. Very often we 
are not people; when partners or senior associates need help on a big 
or pressing project, their panicked demand is: "We need bodies." In 
fact, we regularly refer to ourselves as "fungible" and "dispensable." 
These have become terms of art in a profession whose central concerns 
are supposedly to execute justice and to be responsive to the human 
element. What kind of self-image does such self-reference suggest? 
How is it that a profession that supposedly revolves around human 
conflict and resolution has become so thing oriented, so goods 
oriented? 
Along similar lines, it is common knowledge that young associates 
may not be "profitable" in their first year, given learning time, the cost 
of recruiting the associate, and other factors. But why do we com-
monly know, or even need to know, about a lawyer's "profitability"? 
Does that lawyer do good work? Does that lawyer treat clients with 
respect? Does that lawyer treat other lawyers with respect? Is that 
lawyer committed to public service? "Profitable" does not include any 
of these measurements. "Profitable" means that a lawyer bills a quan-
83. Edwards, supra note 5, at 67 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Practitioners # 1, at 4 and 
#14, at 3). 
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tity of hours to clients that will bring in about four times as much 
revenue as her salary. 
Partners, mostly men and mostly white, no matter the city, no 
matter the firm, exercise an unwarranted amount of control over not 
only the lives of associates (for example, giving assignments at 6 p.m. 
that are due the next morning), but also over their psyches as well. 
Most associates would never dream of telling a partner "no," and 
many will put up with professional abuse that they would never take 
elsewhere. There is, unfortunately, an ethic of bullying that begins in 
first-year classes (where the professor reigns supreme) and continues 
in practice (where the partner reigns supreme). American law, being 
adversarial in nature, not only attracts antagonistic characters, it cre-
ates them. There is a significant minority of senior practitioners who 
mistreat the very people whose loyalty and good work the senior part-
ners need to cultivate. No one learns well, over a long period, in an 
uneasy work environment. Law firms have become subsidized tan-
trum industries. 
We agree, therefore, with Judge Edwards when he decries the ex-
tent to which firms have contributed to the profession's misshapen im-
age. He has an ally in, and sounds very much like, the critical legal 
scholar Duncan Kennedy, who wrote ten years ago: 
The total number of [attorney] jobs that directly serve the public interest 
is small .... The notion that lawyers as a group work at a profession 
which is intrinsically involved with justice, or that lawyers are at least on 
the front lines of class struggle, is one of the things that allow left stu-
dents to resolve their ambivalence enough to go to law school. But in 
fact the profession is mainly engaged in greasing the wheels of the 
economy.84 
Law firms, and the legal profession, will eventually pay the price if 
some sort of reform is not instituted immediately. Good work cannot 
be produced over any significant length of time from overextended, 
insecure, one-dimensional people. We are on the way to a profession 
of burnouts, if we are not there already. 
By way of anecdotal reporting, let us say that we are also ac-
quainted with some of "the best and the brightest," whom we will 
quote anonymously herein, in the same way that Edwards used his 
former clerks' responses. No particular firm is represented, and no 
particular school is represented. All of the people in the examples we 
will set forth are graduates of "so-called elite" law schools. All have 
had experience in large law firms. Most are still employed at large law 
84. DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A 
POLEMIC AGAINsr THE SYsrEM 34 (1983). This publication is known colloquially as "The Red 
Book." 
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firms.SS 
Recent Graduate #l's experience at a large corporate law firm, 
although occasionally enjoyable in terms of what he is learning, forces 
him to work ten- to fourteen-hour days regularly, and most weekends. 
Recent Graduate # 1 is African American. After working for six 
months at his law firm, he concluded dejectedly, upending all his ear-
lier sentiments about getting ahead by working hard and not worrying 
about race, that he was ·~ust a n_r with an Ivy League law de-
gree." He stays because he has school loans to pay.86 
Recent Graduate #2, who majored in psychology and is terrific 
with people, fights off the daily depression that her first-year associate 
job at a big firm creates. When she talks to her peers, they too are 
unhappy, but they are even more terrified of losing their jobs. It is 
difficult to bill the hours demanded and also to do good work. Recent 
Graduate #2 has been "kindly" warned that her hours are low, with 
no reference to the quality of her work, nor to what she has learned; 
five months into her career, a partner called her into his office to con-
vey how important it was for her to "make target" (about 160 billable 
hours, which requires more than 200 hours of actual working time) 
every month. Recent Graduate #2 also has to maneuver often to 
avoid what she feels are sexual or romantic overtures from a male 
partner. Recent Graduate #2 is an activist feminist. But she does not 
have enough "hard" evidence to present to what she knows will be a 
grilling committee, so she simply goes out of her way frequently to 
avoid her harasser. Recent Graduate #2 stays because she has school 
loans to pay.87 
Recent Graduate #3 is a third-year associate at a large corporate 
law firm. She often says, "I hate my life," and "I have no life to hate." 
One day a group of us from different firms were discussing the com-
mon and disturbing scene of a partner's yelling at a young associate 
who looks humiliated and ashamed. This woman, whose common 
sense I had up until then respected, bluntly informed me that "We 
[associates] are paid to take sh- from partners."ss 
Recent Graduates #4 through # 8 left their firms after less than 
one year despite their loans. The reason? Dreadful work, dreadful 
85. For the sake of convenience, and to preserve the anonymity of the persons surveyed, they 
are identified as Recent Graduate #-. 
86. Interview with Recent Graduate #1 (Dec. 1992). 
87. Weekly Interviews with Recent Graduate #2 (Sept. 1992 - June 1993). 
88. Conversation with Recent Graduate #3 and others (Feb. 1993). 
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hours, and dreadful pressure to be money-making machines. 89 
Recent Graduate # 10 calls his first-year associate work dulling to 
the point of depression. He billed 230 hours last month. He feels 
guilty for working any less than fourteen-hour days. An associate not 
much older than he regularly tells him that his efforts are not satisfac-
tory. He rarely speaks with partners, never sees clients, and spends 
most of his time doing what he calls "no brainer" work. He is com-
mitted to pro bona work but can rarely find the time to do any.90 
Recent Graduate # 11, understanding as most associates do that 
big firm work does not vary much in substance for the most part, en-
tered her firm because its hiring seemed to be more progressive than 
that of most big firms. Although there were no African-American 
partners, no Latino partners, no Asian-American partners, no openly 
gay or lesbian partners, and only a handful of white women partners, 
the firm's associate ranks looked encouraging. Recruiting had done a 
better-than-average job of attracting a group of junior attorneys who 
resembled both the law school community and the community at 
large. The recession hit. Associates, under direct pressure to leave or 
indirect pressure to remove themselves voluntarily, began to depart in 
large numbers. Recent Graduate # 11 noticed that a startling propor-
tion of those leaving were not white men. When Recent Graduate 
# 11 brought her concerns to partners she believed would be respon-
sive, one of them privately agreed with her assessment that the firm 
had retreated on its commitment to transforming the old-boy network. 
Another partner, probably in mistaken and unconscious collusion (Re-
cent Graduate #11 is white), said among other things, "We can only 
give them [people of color] the opportunity to come. We can't force 
them to take advantage of it."9 1 
Reifi.cation is the process of regarding that which is not a material 
thing as if it were a material thing. American law has a long history of 
its privileged citizens' treatment of other human beings as if they were 
things. American law has a long tradition, in other words, of reifi.ca-
tion. The Constitution and common law designated enslaved Blacks 
as property, as chattel goods, as things to be had - fungible, dispensa-
ble, purchasable.92 White male legislators "herded" Native Ameri-
89. Interview with Recent Graduate #9 (Jan. 1992) (discussing Recent Law School Gradu-
ates #4-#8). 
90. Interview with Recent Graduate #10 (May 1993). 
91. Letter from Recent Graduate #11 (July 1993) (on file with author). 
92. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW§ 1.6 (3d ed. 1992): 
Beginning with the early colonial period and extending up to the time of the Civil War, 
there was a vast amount of litigation at both the state and federal levels involving blacks. In 
virtually all of the cases, blacks were the subjects and not the parties in the litigation. They 
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cans onto reservations, described them as "savage beasts," and treated 
these original residents as if they lacked personhood.93 The white-
male-dominated army summarily rounded up Japanese Americans like 
cattle into "war relocation camps" during World War Il.94 White 
government scientists used African-American men as laboratory ani-
mals for the testing of syphilis.95 Doctors, some carrying out govern-
ment orders, involuntarily sterilized, and still sterilize, poor women, 
Black women, American-Indian women, and Latinas.96 The state ap-
propriated the bodies of all women by condoning female genital muti-
lation to stop everything from "truancy" to sexual pleasure.97 The 
state still treats women's bodies as things, as apart from personhood; 
in the eyes of the law, a woman's body is a reproduction vehicle that 
must be carefully regulated, whether by requiring a woman seeking an 
abortion to second-guess her decision or by preventing women from 
working in certain industries (which ought to be made safer regard-
less) simply because they have one-half of the ability to bear children 
(at last count, it did take sperm). 
were property subject to ownership; and the law, reflecting as it did then the prevailing belief 
in the inherent inferiority of all blacks, experienced little difficulty in treating them as "chat-
tels personal." 
Id. § 1.6, at 16 (3d ed. 1992) (footnote omitted) (citing I-IV JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING 
AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO (Helen T. Caterwall ed., 1926-1936); KENNETH M. 
STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION 197-236 (1956); see also BELL, supra, §§ 1.6-.11, at 15-
36. 
93. See, e.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL 
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CoNQUEST (1990); see also Williams, supra note 58. Williams 
states: 
[T]he Founding Fathers of the United States ... retained the legal legacy of a European 
Christian conqueror's superior rights of self-rule and jurisdiction over the territory and re-
sources held by non-Christian "savages." That medievally-derived legacy of racial discrimi-
nation against indigenous tribal peoples today is found firmly embodied and 
institutionalized in the Supreme Court's unquestioned reliance on and elaboration of the 
core doctrines of Federal Indian law. 
Id. at 68. 
94. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
95. See, e.g., Alan R. Geraldi, Comment, In His Image: On Patenting Human-Based Bi-
oproducts, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 583, 595 n.105 (1991) ("[I]n a case study initiated by the United 
States Public Health Services in 1930, a group of African-American males, who were infected 
with syphilis, were not only left untreated, they were prevented from getting treatment so that 
the progression of the disease could be studied.") (citation omitted). 
96. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS 213-21 (1981). 
97. See MARILYN FRENCH, THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN 106-14 (1992): 
Clitoridectomy was widely practiced in Europe and the United States, especially during 
the second half of the nineteenth century .•.. 
. • . It was often performed in mental hospitals until 1935. Doctors in America were 
willing to perform even infibulation [the sewing together of vaginal lips] into the twentieth 
century to keep females from masturbating. Holt's Diseases of Infancy and Childhood 
(1936) recommended cauterization or removal of the clitoris to cure masturbation in 
girls .... Scholar Lilian Passmore Sanderson writes that both [clitoral excision and labial 
infibulation] are still performed in the United States and Europe. 
Id. at 110-11 (footnotes omitted). 
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This "thingification" of human beings is a means of controlling 
them - for awhile. Sooner or later most human beings, no matter 
how dejected, no matter how convinced they are that they will never 
be treated as anything except a thing for use or exploitation by an-
other, will check out. They will fight back and insist that they are not 
labor machines; or, that being impossible, they will mentally and emo-
tionally check out from the labor they are doing. The idea of a bunch 
of spaced-out, overworked, socially impaired attorneys may have been 
amusing to the "honorable" old company of white male lawyers from 
chummier, more pedigreed times. Today it is a reality. Moreover, the 
people making the decision to run law firms like labor camps are, for 
the most part, still white men. 
To be overly concerned with profit, especially in the context of the 
law, has led to the mistreatment of human beings. In a modem sense, 
law firms' hyperfocus on profit has created a generation of lawyers 
whose minds are numb. The pressure to bill hours and increase profits 
has created lawyers whose commitment to being "honorable" of neces-
sity lags far behind their commitment simply tp make it through the 
day, the week, the year. Tellingly, the worst of the work-crazed firms 
are called "sweatshops." There, as in most firms, most associate work 
is monotonous, detailed, and difficult. For years, there is little "hands-
on" training, which creates a late learning curve akin to a pressure 
cooker. Who has time or energy, given this environment, to be a 
"public servant"? Who has time to notice that the members of the 
profession grow increasingly indecent, increasingly incapable of deem-
ing worthy anything but corporate America's problems? 
On this count, Judge Edwards is right. If, as Felix Frankfurter 
says, "the law is what the lawyers are,"98 then we had better be pre-
pared for a law that encourages sacrifice to the dollar even more than 
it does at present. We had better be prepared for a law that in letter, 
as well as in practice, slants toward the powers of capital. We had 
better be prepared, in short, for a law that not only glorifies the greed 
of unchecked markets, but that sacrifices everything in order to assist 
in that greed. 
Fortunately, there are alternative visions. With the exception of 
law and economics (whose focus is efficiency), those alternative visions 
are shaped and advanced by the very disciplines that Judge Edwards 
fears. There is the environmental law's vision of a country who takes 
98. Edwards, supra note 5, at 34 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Mr. Rosenwald 3 
(May 13, 1927) (Felix Frankfurter papers, Harvard Law School Library), quoted in RAND JACK 
& DANA C. JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES 
OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS 156 (1989)). 
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her resources and her unborn citizens seriously enough to take good 
care of the earth. There is the feminist vision of a country whose laws 
do not allow women to be beaten with impunity, whose laws enforce 
the idea that traditional "women's" work should be compensated, 
whose laws ensure that women make one dollar for every man's dollar 
doing identical work, and not seventy cents. There is the critical race 
scholars' vision of a country whose laws enforce the substantive imper-
atives - and not just the facial machinations - of racial equality; 
whose laws guarantee voting rights, a jury of peers, housing, and edu-
cation to Blacks, Latinos, Asian Americans, and Native Americans. 
There is, in short, no shortage of alternative visions, many of 
which are progressive and humanitarian. As the first part of this arti-
cle argued, the alternative visions taught in law school today are not to 
blame for the current crisis of ethics in the profession and its obsession 
with profits. Indeed, the "alternative" visions may be the only hope to 
turn the profession toward an "honorability" that goes beyond the 
niceties of aristocratic gentlemen and is truly honorable. 
